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Abstract
Economic integratin such as free trade areas (FTA) and customs uions (CU) allows
importing countries to circumvent the constraint of non-discriminatory tari±s posed by
the most favorened nation clause in GATT and to employ (incomplete) tari® discrimina-
tion. Thus the second-best choice for the importing country, if it does regional integration,
is to choose as the partner the exporting country which would have been subject to the
lower tari® under the full tari® discrimination. Regardless of the mode of competition,
we will ¯nd that such a partner tends to be less e±cient than other exporting countries,
which implies that voluntary regional integration leads the world economy to less e±cient
resource allocations.
Keywords: economic integration, tari® discrimination, second-best policy, conjectural
variations, oligopoly
JEL classi¯cation: F12, F13, F15
1 Introduction
Since the seminal article by Viner (1950), there has been a vast literature on theories of eco-
nomic integration. Somewhat problematic concepts of \trade creation" and \trade diversion"
have been reexamined in various frameworks when discussing the welfare e®ects of integra-
tion. Although Meade elucidated those concepts within a framework of a small country and
the partial equilibrium approach, there are many other studies casting doubts on those con-
ceptual tools such as Bhagwati and Panagriya (1996). Even without agreement on how to
use the two concepts, the economists have also extended the theory of economic integration
to imperfect competition as well as economic growth. 1
However there is another question for research, often less focused in this literature. That
is, what country is chosen as the FTA partner? From the viewpoint of the exporting country,
¤Very preliminary. Please do not quote without the author's permission.
yFaculty of Political Science & Economics, Waseda University. E-mail address: kazr@waseda.jp
1See the extensive surveys by Panagariya (2000) and Baldwin and Venables (1995).
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it would welcome any economic integration leading to the preferential removal of the currently
imposed import tari®s. However from the viewpoint of the importing country, it is vital which
exporting country's tari® to remove, for the change in its terms of trade greatly depends on
its choice of economic integration partners. 2
For the large importing country, the best trade policy is tari® discrimination or import-
price discrimination by making the best of its monopsony power in trade. As is implied by the
application of the price discrimination to monopsony, when the marginal import costs di®er
among the exporting countries, the importing country can maximize its welfare by equating
those marginal import costs and thus minimizing the total import costs. Put di®erently, from
the viewpoint of the standard optimal tari® theory shows, the international monopsonist
should set the lower import price or equivalently the higher import tari® to the exporting
country with the smaller price elasticity of supply, But such tari® discrimination is disallowed
in GATT under the most favored nation clause. The only ways to circumvent this constraint
are formations of free trade areas (FTA's) and customs unions (CU's). Since such economic
integration allows the importing country to employ incomplete but discriminatory tari®s, we
may pose the problem of choosing the partner for economic integration as the one of removing
the tari®s on either the exporting country subject to the higher or lower tari® under the full
tari® discrimination.
Since lowering the higher optimal discriminatory tari® to zero tends to cause the greater
costs to the importing country, the intuition tells us that the importing country has the
greater incentive to choose the exporting country with the lower optimal discriminatory tari®
as its partner. In this paper, we deal with FTA formation and discuss how this intuition holds
not only in perfect competition but also in more general imperfect competition. 3 As we will
see later, the marginal import cost tends to be lower for the exporting country with the less
e±cient technologies, which makes the optimal discriminatory tari® lower. This implies that
the importing country tends to choose the less e±cient technology as its FTA partner.
In section 2, we review the puzzle of welfare-worsening FTA formations with an exporting
country having the lower marginal cost posed by Bhagwati and Panagriya (1996) and elucidate
the problem of tari® discrimination governing the welfare e®ect of FTA formation. In section
3, we construct the basic model of FTA formation as the second-best discriminatory policy in
perfect competition, and establishe the basic principle for the importing country's choosing
the FTA partner. In section 4, we extend the model to imperfect competition described by the
2For example, McMillan and MacCann (1981) explores this problem from the viewpoint of complementarity
and substitution of goods traded in perfect competition. But there are little research explicitly dealing with
the FTA partner choice in imperfect competition except Kiyono (1993) and Ra® (2001), though Ra® (2001)
discusses the problem from the viewpoint of tari® revenue maximization.
3The approach is essentially the same as Kiyono (1993) discussing the importing country's choice on the
FTA partner within a homogenous Cournot oligopoly market. But the present paper makes clear how the
second-best approach covers not only perfect competition but also imperfect competition and generalizes the
discussion in two directions. First, the paper covers the case of non-constant marginal costs. And Second, it
deal with the quasi-Cournot oligopoly market in which the ¯rms hold non-Cournot conjectural variations.
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conjectural variations equilibria, and demonstrate that the results in perfect competition still
hold. Lastly in section 5, we extend the analysis by incorporating the domestic production
in the importing country. We will ¯nd its e®ect on the tari® discrimination and the choice of
the FTA partners with some more remarks on future possible directions for the research.
2 FTA Formation for a Large Importing Country
Let us make a brief review over the examples of Bhagwati and Panagriya (1996), illustrated
by Figures 1 and 2, which show the complicated welfare e®ects of FTA formation by a large
country importing from two exporting countries in perfect competition.
2.1 Ambiguous Welfare E®ects of FTA Formation?
In each of the two ¯gures, the downward sloping curve DD0 represents the import demand
curve of the importing country while the horizontal line cLc0L indicates the export supply curve
of country L and the upward sloping line cHc0H that of country H. Initially the importing
country imposes the nondiscriminatory or uniform speci¯c import tari® tU on the imports
from both exporting countries. Thus the total supply curve facing the private sector in the
importing country is given by the kinked curve cTLUc
T 0
H , leading to the equilibrium shown by
point E. Of the total import cTHE, c
T
HU comes from country L and UE from country H. The
trade surplus for the private sector in the importing country is given by the triangle DcTHE,
and the tari® revenue by the square cTHcHU
0U , the sum of which constitutes the total welfare
of the importing country.
Then what if the importing country forms a FTA with country L given the external tari®
tU?
In Figure 1, the market supply curve facing the importing country's private sector is now
given by the kinked curve cLLcT 0H , so that the market equilibrium in the importing country is
still given by point E. Since the import from country L is free, the tari® revenue earned before
the FTA formation, measured by 2cTHcHU
0U now vanishes, and furthermore substitution of
the import cTHE from country H to country L also makes the country lose the extra tari®
revenue measured by 2UU 0L0L. Therefore the importing country becomes worse o® su®ering
from the total loss 2cTHcHL
0L. Since the loss of the tari® revenue is due to the trade diversion
e®ect, the importing country's welfare loss entirely comes from this welfare-worsening trade
diversion e®ect.
The situation is a little more complicated in Figure 2. The market supply curve facing
the private sector in the importing country is now given by the kinked curve cLFcT 0H , so that
the new equilibrium is given by point L. All the imports come from country L with the
lower domestic price pL and more consumption pLL. The importing country gains from more
consumption as much as 2cTHpLFE (the trade creation e®ect), while it loses all the tari®
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Figure 1: Bhagwati-Panagariya Example 1
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revenue earned before FTA formation, i.e., cTHcHE
0E (the trade diversion e®ect). Thus its
net welfare gain is given by ¢EAL minus 2pLcHE0A, or equivalently the gains from trade
creation minus the costs from trade diversion. The welfare e®ect of FTA formation now
depends on which e®ect of trade creation and diversion dominates the other.
cH
cL
Price QuantityD D′MICL0cTH c′Hc′LcTL cT ′L cT ′HUU ′ LL′EE′ HU ′′ L′′pL tUE′′ABB′B′′ F
Figure 2: Bhagwati-Panagariya Example 2
2.2 Tari® Discrimination as Import-Price Discrimination
This familiar discussion overlooks the important status of the importing country in the world
market, i.e., the monopsonist. Sine it faces upward-sloping export supply curves, the import-
ing country can make the best of its monopsony power.
And as the monopsonist, the best strategy for the importing country is price discrimination
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over the exporters. It ¯rst minimizes the total import costs by equating the marginal import
costs from each country and then decides on the amount of the total import by equating the
own marginal bene¯t of consumption with the equalized marginal import costs between the
two exporting countries.
In each of Figures 1 and 2, the marginal import cost from country L, given by curve
MICL, is located above the upward-sloping export supply curve cLc0L, while that of country
H coincides its horizontal export supply curve cHc0H . Thus the marginal import cost curve
for the price-discriminating importing country is given by the kinked curve cLB0c0H . It is
the best for the importing country to import as much as cHH, of which cHB0 comes from
country L and B0H from country H. To achieve this ¯rst-best state, the importing country
should impose the discriminatory tari®s to the two exporting countries, BB0 on country L
and zero tari® on country H. Import-price discrimination involves tari® discrimination. The
total welfare is then given by the trade surplus of the private sector measured by ¢DcHH
and the tari® revenue 2cHB00BB0. That is, FTA formation with country H, rather than with
country L, should be chosen by the importing country.
2.3 Choice of FTA Partners
However, when the country is subject to the most favored nation clause, it cannot undertake
full tari® discrimination. It can enforce only an imperfect one trough economic integration
such as FTA and CU by providing preferential zero tari®s to the partner countries. The
available alternative policies for the importing country is either uniform tari®s to all the
exporting countries or imperfect tari® discrimination through economic integration. Let us
take FTA as an example of economic integration throughout the rest of the paper.
The intuition tells us that it is better for the importing country to form a FTA with the
exporting country whose optimal discriminatory tari® is lower than the other, for the costs of
required tari® reduction should be smaller than the FTA with the other exporting country.
In fact, as the two Figures show, the marginal import cost of country L, whose optimal
discriminatory tari® is the higher, is greater than that of country H, so that the import
substitution from country H to country L after FTA formation with country L increases the
total import costs and thus makes the importing county worse o®. For example, in Figure 1,
although the total import volume is kept unchanged, the import substitution raises the total
import costs as much as the trapezoid shape of U 00U 0L0L00, which is another expression for the
country's welfare loss from FTA formation with country L. And in Figure 2, the importing
country su®ers from two types of welfare loss. The ¯rst is the increased import costs from
import substitution, measured by 2U 00U 0E0E00, and the second is the excessive consumption
due to the marginal import cost greater than the marginal bene¯t of consumption, measured
by the trapezoid shape of E00EFL00. Thus, the importing country is strictly worse o® by
FTA formation with country L, though this result has not been recognized in the previous
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literature.
3 FTA Formation in Perfect Competition
Let us generalize the analysis in the previous section, and elucidate further the properties of
the candidates as FTA partners.
3.1 Competitive Model
As in the previous section, consider a country totally depending on the imports from two
exporting countries, H and L, for consumption of a certain good. There are ni identical
competitive ¯rms in each exporting country i 2 fH;Lg with the total export cost function
Ci(xi) where xi denotes the individual output for export in country i. Let Xi := nixi denote
the total export of country i, XT :=
P
kXk the total exports, and p the domestic price in the
importing country. Then the pro¯t of an individual ¯rm in country i is given by
¼i := pxi ¡ Ci(xi)¡ tixi;
where ti denotes the speci¯c tari® imposed by the importing country's government on export-
ing country i. We assume
Assumption 1 The marginal cost of each ¯rm in each country is non-decreasing in the
output, i.e., C 00i (xi) > 0 for i = H;L.
Since each exporting ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t by equating the marginal cost with the
gross-tari® export price, denoted by vi = p ¡ ti. The condition de¯nes the individual ¯rm's
export supply price function given by
vi = vi (xi) := C 0i (xi) : (1)
Its inverse is the individual export supply function si(vi), and the total export supply by
country i expressed by Si(Xi : ni) := nisi(vi).
There are two remarks in order here. First, the price elasticity of country i's export supply
is the same as that of the individual export supply, which we denote by "Si (vi). Second, since
this price elasticity is equal to the inverse of the output elasticity of marginal cost, there holds
"Si (vi) =
1
¾i (si(vi))
(2)
where ¾i(xi) := d lnC 0i
¡
si(vi)
¢
=d lnxi denotes the output elasticity of country i's marginal
cost or equivalently the output elasticity of the export supply price, d ln vi(xi)=d lnxi. The
two countries di®er with respect to the price elasticity of export or the output elasticity of
the marginal cost as follows.
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Assumption 2 There holds "SH(v) > "
S
L(v) for all common export price v. Or equivalently,
there holds ¾H(xH) < ¾L(xL) for all (xH ; xL) satisfying C 0H(xH) = C
0
L(xL).
The total import costs, denoted by TIC, is then given by
TIC (XH ; XL;nH ; nL) :=
X
k
vk
µ
Xk
nk
¶
Xk: (3)
The marginal import cost from country i, denoted by MICi, is given by
MICi(Xi) :=
@TIC(XH ; XL)
@Xi
= vi
µ
Xi
ni
¶
+ xiC 00i (xi) = C
0
i(xi) (1 + ¾i(xi)) ; (4)
which is independent of the import from the other exporting country. 4
The welfare of the importing country is expressed by
W = u
ÃX
k
Xk
!
¡ P
ÃX
k
Xk
!
¢
X
k
Xk +
X
k
tkXk;
which can be rewritten
W (X) = u
ÃX
k
Xk
!
¡ TIC(XH ; XL); (5)
where X := (XH ; XL) and use was made of (1). Without loss of generality, we assume that
W (X) is strictly concave.
3.2 Optimal Tari® Discrimination
Let us ¯rst explore the policy of optimal tari® discrimination as import-price discrimination.
Let us express the equilibrium values with superscript D. Then the optimal import from each
country should satisfy the following conditions for welfare maximization. 5
Condition 1: Minimization of the total import costs given the total import volume, i.e.,
MICH(XDH ) =MIC
L(XDL ).
Condition 2: Equality between the marginal consumption bene¯t and the equalized
marginal import costs, i.e., P (XDT ) =MIC
H(XDH ).
4As we will see later, this independence property fails to hold in imperfect competition.
5We assume here, though not stated explicitly in the text,
MICi(Xmi ) > MIC
j(0) (i; j = H;L; j 6= i);
where Xmi := maxfXig fW (X)jXj = 0g. If this condition fails, then the ¯rst-best tari® rate is given by
tmi := P (X
m
i ) ¡ vi(Xmi ), which automatically prevents the import from country j. Then FTA formation is
de¯nitely worse than this optimal uniform tari® policy.
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Since MICi(Xi) = C 0i(xi) + xiC
00
i (xi) and the speci¯c tari® rate is equal to the di®erence
between the domestic price (=the marginal consumption bene¯t) and the export price, Con-
dition 2 above implies that the optimal discriminatory tari® on country i, denoted by tDi , is
given by
tDi = C
0
i(x
D
i )¾i(x
D
i ): (6)
This is the speci¯c-tari® version of the familiar optimal tari® formula. The examples of
Bhagwati and Panagriya (1996) are based on the marginal cost function given by
C 0i(xi) = ci +
xi
si
; (BP-MC)
where ci and si are positive constants. The marginal import cost from each country is then
equal to MICi(Xi) = ci + 2xisi , so that Condition 2 implies
xDi C
00
i (x
D
i ) =
xDi
si
=
1
2
¡
pD ¡ ci
¢
;
where pD := P (XDT ). Thus, the optimal discriminatory tari® is equal to
tDi =
1
2
¡
pD ¡ ci
¢
(i = H;L)
by virtue of (6). Therefore for the marginal cost functions (BP-MC) discussed by Bhagwati
and Panagriya (1996), the di®erence in the optimal discriminatory tari®s depends only on
each country's choke price for export, ci, and thus country L faces the higher tari® under the
optimal tari® discrimination.
Proposition 1 When both exporting countries are subject to the marginal costs given by
(BP-MC) under perfect competition, the exporting country with the lower choke price face the
higher optimal discriminatory import tari®.
3.3 Optimal Uniform Tari® Policy
Now consider the optimal uniform tari® policy, i.e., the non-discriminatory import-pricing to
both exporting countries. As both exporting countries face the same tari® and thus the same
export price, their marginal costs should be equal, i.e., C 0H
³
XH
nH
´
= C 0L
³
XL
nL
´
. This equality
governs the export by country L as a function of the export by country H for any rate of
uniform tari®s, which we express by XL = °H(XH). This function satis¯es
°0H(XH) =
nLC
00
L(xL)
nHC 00H(xH)
=
XL¾H(xH)
XH¾L(xL)
> 0: (7)
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Using this function °H(XH), we may express the optimal uniform-tari® policy prob-
lem faced by the importing country as maxfXHgW (XH ; °H(XH)) where we assume that
W (XH ; °H(XH)) is strictly concave in XH . For characterizing this equilibrium, the following
lemma is of a great use.
Lemma 1 For any uniform tari®, there holds @W (XH ;XL)@XH >
@W (XH ;WL)
@XL
, or equivalently
MICH(XH) < MICL(XL).
This follows straightforward from the following inequality based on the de¯nition of the
marginal import costs.
@W (X)
@XH
¡ @W (X)
@XL
=
©
p¡ C 0H(xH) (1 + ¾H(xH))
ª¡ ©p¡ C 0L (1 + ¾L(xL))ª
=C 0H(xH) f¾L(xL)¡ ¾H(xH)g > 0
(* C 0H(xH) = C 0L(xL) under the uniform tari®s, and Assumption 2)
Now we characterize the optimal uniform tari® policy equilibrium as the solution to
maxfXHgW (XH ; °H(XH)). Let us represent the variables associated with the resulting opti-
mal uniform tari® policy equilibrium with superscript \U¤". Then the associated ¯rst-order
condition for welfare maximization is given by
0 =
@W
¡
XU¤H ; °H(X
U¤
H )
¢
@XH
+
@W
¡
XU¤H ; °H(X
U¤
H )
¢
@XL
°0H
¡
XU¤H
¢
=
©
P (XU¤T )¡MICH(XU¤H )
ª
+
©
P (XU¤T )¡MICL(XU¤L )
ª
°0H(X
U¤
H )
<
¡
1 + °0H(X
U¤
H )
¢ @W ¡XU¤H ; °H(XU¤H )¢
@XH
(* °0H(XH) > 0 and Lemma 1);
which implies
@W(XU¤H ;°H(XU¤H ))
@XH
> 0, and thus
@W(XU¤H ;°H(XU¤H ))
@XL
< 0 due to °0H(XH) > 0.
Therefore we have established
Lemma 2 At the optimal uniform tari® policy equilibrium, there holds
@W(XU¤H ;°H(XU¤H ))
@XH
>
0 >
@W(XU¤H ;°H(XU¤H ))
@XL
.
3.4 FTA Formation
What if the importing country abandons the optimal uniform tari® policy and forms a FTA
with either exporting country? Let us denote by X ik(i; k 2 fH;Lg) the import from country
k, by W i the importing country's welfare when a FTA is formed with country i, and by
WU¤ the welfare under the optimal uniform tari® policy. Since the welfare function is strictly
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concave, there holds the following inequality governing the welfare between the two states.
W i ¡WU¤
·@W
¡
XU¤H ; °H(X
U¤
H )
¢
@XH
¡
X iH ¡XU¤H
¢
+
@W
¡
XU¤H ; °H(X
U¤
H )
¢
@XL
¡
X iL ¡XU¤L
¢
: (8)
Then it is straightforward to derive the following proposition by virtue of the above
inequality and Lemma 2.
Proposition 2 When the FTA formation with country i gives rise to either (i) XiH ·
XU¤H ; X
i
L ¸ XU¤L , or/and (ii) X iT · XU¤T , then the importing country cannot get better o® by
the FTA formation.
This proposition indicates two sets of conditions for welfare-worsening FTA formation
compared with the optimal uniform tari® policy. Condition (i) is immediate from (8) by
virtue of Lemma 2. It implies that in sofar as the FTA expands the import from the partner
but reduces the import from the non-partner, then the importing country gets worse o® by
the FTA formation with country L.
Condition (ii) can be obtained by rewriting (8) as follows.
W i ¡W ¤ · @W
¡
XU¤H ; °H(X
U¤
H )
¢
@XH
©
(X iH ¡XU¤H ) + (XiL ¡XU¤L )
ª
;
where use was again made of Lemma 2. The condition implies that when the total import
volume does not exceed after the FTA formation, then the importing country gets worse o®
than under the optimal uniform tari® policy.
In view of Proposition 2, when the importing country ¯nds FTA formation better than
the optimal uniform tari® policy, then the partner should be country H facing the higher
optimal discriminatory tari® and the FTA should expand the total import volume.
4 FTA Formation in Imperfect Competition
Let us extend our analysis towards imperfect competition µa la Cournot. 6 For simplicity of
exposition, we additionally assume
Assumption 3 The inverse demand function P (XT ) is concave, i.e., P 00(XT ) · 0.
This assumption ensures the individual output to be always a strategic substitute to the
others' and the equilibrium, whenever it exists, to be unique and globally stable. 7
6The model framework is essentially the same as Brander and Spencer (1984).
7This assures the so-called \Hahn condition" for stability of Cournot equilibrium (Hahn (1962)). See also
the modern approach to the problem of uniqueness and stability of Cournot equilibrium discussed by Kolstad
and Mathiesen (1987), Okuguchi (1976) and Gaudet and Salant (1991) for instance. Their discussion can be
readily applied to the present conjectural variations approach.
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On the other hand, we relax Assumption 1 as follows so that we can take account of the
case of constant marginal costs,too.
Assumption 4 The marginal cost of each ¯rm in each country is non-decreasing in the
output, i.e., C 00i (xi) ¸ 0 for i = H;L.
We also discuss more general mode of competition than the standard Cournot model, by
employing the conjectural variations approach. 8
Assumption 5 Each ¯rm in country i(2 fH;Lg) has the same constant value of conjectural
variations ¸i(> 0), which represents how much it expects the total output to increase along
with its output expansion.
Then the ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t maximization is
0 = P (XT ) + ¸ixiP 0(XT )¡ C 0i(xi)¡ ti;
which implies that the equilibrium individual outputs are the same for all the ¯rms located
in the same country. Thus, the equilibrium condition for the industry as a whole in country
i is expressed by
0 = P (XT ) +
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )¡ C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
¡ ti: (9)
As in perfect competition, vi := P (XT )¡ ti represents the import price from country i (or
the export price facing country i). (9) then de¯nes the export supply price function of each
exporting country as
vi(Xi; XT ;ni; ¸i) := C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
+ IMRi
µ
Xi; XT
¸i
ni
¶
; (10)
where
IMRi
µ
Xi; XT ;
¸i
ni
¶
:= ¡¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT ) (11)
represents the individual monopoly rent earned per unit of output by the individual ¯rm in
country i and satis¯es
@IMRi(Xi; XT )
@Xi
= ¡¸i
ni
P 0(XT ) =
1
Xi
©
P (XT )¡ C 0i(xi)¡ ti
ª
> 0; (12)
@IMRi(Xi; XT )
@XT
= ¡P 00(XT )¸i
ni
Xi ¸ 0; (13)
8Compared with the previous studies such as Gatsios (1990), Hwan and Mai (1991), Kiyono (1993), Ra®
(2001) and Saggi (2004), conjectural variations allow us to explore various modes of competiton covering perfect
equilibria, Cournot-Nash equilibria, and compelte or incomplete joint pro¯t maximization. See Kamien and
Schwartz (1983) and Cabral (1995) for the usefulness of this concept.
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by virtue of Assumption 3. As expressed by (10), the export price of each country now
depends not only on its own output but also on the other's, and exceeds the marginal cost
by the individual monopoly rent. In view of (12) and (13), one should also note that the
individual monopoly rent of each ¯rm is increasing in both its own output and the industry
output.
Let X := (XH ; XL) represent the import vector. Then the total import cost function,
denoted by TIC(X;n;¸) :=
P
k v
k(Xk; XT )Xk, is also expressed as follows.
TIC(X;n;¸) =
X
k
Xk ¢ C 0k
µ
Xk
nk
¶
+
X
k
Xk ¢ IMRk (Xk; XT ) (14)
=
X
k
Xk ¢ C 0k
µ
Xk
nk
¶
¡ P 0
ÃX
k
Xk
!X
k
¸k
nk
X2k : (15)
The marginal import cost from country i, denoted by MICi(Xi; Xj), is now given by 9
MICi(Xi; Xj) := vi(Xi; XT ) + xiC 00i (xi)
+Xi
@IMRi(Xi; XT )
@Xi
+
X
k
Xk
@IMRk(Xk; XT )
@XT
; (MIC)
where the second term is just the same as in perfect competition as expressed by (4) while the
third and fourth terms are speci¯c to imperfect competition and both are positive by virtue of
(12) and (13). They represent the increased monopoly rents due to country i's output increase.
In the following analysis, the following alternative expression for the marginal import costs
is of a great use.
MICi(Xi; Xj) = xiC 00i (xi)¡ C 0i(xi)¡ 2ti + 2P (XT )¡ P 00(XT )
X
k
¸k
nk
X2k ; (MIC-ALT)
where use was made of (9) and (15).
As in perfect competition, the welfare of the importing country, denoted by W (X;n;¸),
is then given by
W (X;n;¸) := U
ÃX
k
Xk
!
¡ TIC (X;n;¸) ; (16)
9More speci¯cally, as with country H for instance, its marginal import cost function is de¯ned as
MICH(XH ; XL) :=
dTIC(XH ; XH +XL)
dXH
=
@TIC(XH ; XH +XL)
@XH
+
@TIC(XH ;XH +XL)
@XT
:
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which is essentially the same as (5) in perfect competition. As in perfect competition, we
assume the following for making the succeeding analysis meaningful. 10
Assumption 6 The welfare function W (X;n;¸) is strictly concave in X.
This completes the description of the model. As has already been discussed, the critical
di®erence in the welfare expression between perfect and imperfect competition is that the
import cost from each exporting country, viXi, depends on the amount of export by the other
exporting country in imperfect competition. 11
Hereafter we extend the previous analysis in perfect competition to imperfect competition.
First, we explore the properties of the optimal tari® discrimination,
4.1 Optimal Tari® Discrimination in Imperfect Competition
As in perfect competition, the import vector XD := (XDH ; X
D
L ) associated with the optimal
tari® discrimination equilibrium, should satisfy 12
Condition 10: Minimization of the total import costs given the total import volume,
i.e., MICH(XDH ; X
D
L ) =MIC
L(XDL ; X
D
H ),
Condition 20: Equality between the marginal consumption bene¯t and the equalized
marginal import costs, i.e., P (XDT ) =MIC
H(XDH ; X
D
L ).
Let us make clear ¯rst by using Condition 10 what governs the di®erence in the optimal
discriminatory tari®s on the exporting countries as in the case of perfect competition. This
Condition 10, coupled with (MIC-ALT), yields
xDHC
00
H(x
D
H)¡ C 0H(xDH)¡ 2tDH = xDLC 00L(xDL )¡ C 0L(xDL )¡ 2tDL
which gives rise to
tDL ¡ tDH =
1
2
©
C 0H(x
D
H)
¡
1¡ ¾H(xDH)
¢¡ C 0L(xDL ) ¡1¡ ¾L(xDL )¢ª : (17)
10The previous studies formulate the importing country's welfare as a function of the tari® vector and assume
that it is concave in the tari® vector. However, the condition to ensure this conavity is more complicated than
when we use the welfare as a function of the import vector as formulated below. In fact, given concavity of the
gross consumption bene¯t function U(XT ), concavity of the inverse demand function P (XT ), and increasing
marginal costs of each ¯rm's export, the welfare function given by (16) is concave in the import vector when
there hold C000(x) ¸ 0 for i = H;L, and P 000(XT ) · 0.
11In perfect competition, country i's export supply function is solely determined by its own exports, i.e.,
@vi(Xi; Xj)=@Xj = 0. This in fact holds when ¸i = 0.
12We also assume essentially the same condition as in perfect competition mentioned in footnote 5. That is,
MICi(Xmi ; 0) > MIC
j(0;Xmi ) (i; j 2 fH;Lg; j 6= i);
where Xmi := argmaxfXig fW (X)jXj = 0g.
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When the marginal cost functions are given by (BP-MC), then the above tari® di®erence
is reduced to
tDL ¡ tDH =
1
2
(cH ¡ cL):
Surprisingly enough, the di®erence in the optimal discriminatory tari®s is just the same as in
perfect competition. 13
Proposition 3 When the marginal costs are expressed by (BP-MC), i.e., C 0i(xi) = ci +
xi
si
,
then there holds tDL ¡ tDH = 12(cH ¡ cL), and the exporting country with the lower choke price
ci is subject to the higher discriminatory tari®.
By Condition 20 coupled with (MIC), we can obtain the general formula for optimal
discriminatory speci¯c tari®s which holds both in perfect and imperfect competition as follows.
tDi = x
D
i C
00
i (x
D
i ) +X
D
i
@IMRi(XDi ; X
D
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
Xk
@IMRk(XDk ; X
D
T )
@XT
;
where use was made ti = P (XT )¡ vi(Xi; XT ).
The ¯rst term on the right hand side is the e®ect of increasing marginal costs working both
in perfect and imperfect competition. Since xiC 00i (xi) = C
0
i(xi)¾i(xi) and ¾i(xi) corresponds
to the inverse of the price elasticity of export supply, we may call it the elasticity e®ect.
On the other hand, as we have discussed on the marginal import costs, the second and third
terms are speci¯c to imperfect competition and both are positive. The second term shows
the e®ect of increased individual monopoly rents, and the third term the e®ect of increased
industry monopoly rents. Unlike the standard literature on taxing oligopoly ¯rms in trade,
the above formula indicates that the optimal tari® does extract not the foreign monopoly
rents but the increased monopoly rents.
Proposition 4 When the importing country enforces the optimal discriminatory tari® policy,
then the associated speci¯c tari® on exporting country i, denoted by tDi , should satisfy
tDi = x
D
i C
00
i (x
D
i ) +X
D
i
@IMRi(XDi ; X
D
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
Xk
@IMRk(XDk ; X
D
T )
@XT
; (i = H;L):
Note that the formula above holds even when we allow the country importing from more
than two exporting countries.
13Gatsios (1990) and Hwan and Mai (1991) derives the following result for the imporing country importing
from two countries, each of which has a single exporting ¯rm, whereas Kiyono (1993) discusses for the case in
which there are more than two symmetric ¯rms in each exporting country, and Saggi (2004) proves it for the
importing country importing from more than two countries. All these studies assume Cournot competition,
i.e., ¸i = 1 for all the ¯rms in questin.
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4.2 Optimal Uniform Tari®s and FTA Formation
We may apply the same logic as in perfect competition and obtain the condition for welfare-
worsening FTA formation compared with the optimal uniform tari® policy. But there are
new problems speci¯c to imperfect competition.
First, Lemma 1, which played an important role to characterize the optimal uniform tari®
policy in perfect competition, does not generally hold in imperfect competition. 14
Second, the raise in the uniform tari® rate, having reduced the individual output in perfect
competition, does not generally decrease all the ¯rms' outputs in imperfect competition,
though it decreases the total output. Since there is at least one country whose export is
decreasing in the uniform tari® rate, we can apply the same approach as in perfect competition
and obtain the following inequality, essentially the same as (8).
W i ¡WU¤ · @W
¡
XU¤
¢
@XH
¡
X iH ¡XU¤H
¢
+
@W
¡
XU¤
¢
@XL
¡
XiL ¡XU¤L
¢
:
Thus there holds the following result with more reservations than in Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 The importing country gets worse o® under the FTA formation with country
i than under the optimal uniform tari® policy if either of the following conditions holds at the
optimal uniform tari® policy equilibrium.
(i) @W (X
U¤)
@XH
> max
n
0; @W (X
U¤)
@XL
o
and X iT · XU¤T .
(ii) @W (X
U¤)
@XH
> 0 ¸ @W (XU¤)@XL and X iH · XU¤H ; XiL ¸ XU¤L .
4.3 FTA Partner Switch and Changes in Welfare
As has been made clear, we are unable to extend the analysis in perfect competition to
imperfectly competitive markets. For this reason, we have to devise di®erent approaches
for ¯nding the better FTA partner for the importing country. Fortunately, when we con¯ne
ourselves to the marginal costs given by (BP-MC), i.e., C 0i(xi) = ci +
xi
si
, then we can obtain
several conditions for the better FTA candidate. This is because the equilibrium given any
tari® policies satis¯es the following useful property under (BP-MC).
Lemma 3 Assume that the marginal cost function in each exporting country is given by
(BP-MC). Then given the conjectural variations and the numbers of active ¯rms in the ex-
porting countries, the equilibrium total output is kept constant if
P
k nk ¢ tk1
sk
¡¸kP 0(XT ) must be
unchanged for the total output to be kept unchanged.
14However it does when the marginal costs are given by (BP-MC),for there holds
MICH(XH ; XL)¡MICL(XL; XH) = cL ¡ cH < 0;
by virtue of cH > cL. This also implies
@W (X )
@XH
> @W (X )
@XL
. These results constitute the counterpart of Lemma
2 in imperfect competition.
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This can be proven as follows. First, when the marginal costs are given by (BP-MC), the
¯rst-order condition for pro¯t maximization by each exporting ¯rm, (9), is rewritten as
P (XT ) +
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )¡
µ
ci +
Xi
sini
+ ti
¶
= 0; (18)
which gives rise to the following quasi-reaction function of exporting country i.
Xi = Ri(XT ; ti) = ni ¢ P (XT )¡ (ci + ti)1
si
¡ ¸iP 0(XT )
:
The market equilibrium requires
XT =
X
k
nk ¢ P (XT )¡ ck1
sk
¡ ¸kP 0(XT )
¡
X
k
nk ¢ tk1
sk
¡ ¸kP 0(XT )
;
which establishes Lemma 3 above.
Using this Lemma 3, we directly compare the welfare between the FTA formation with
country H and the one with country L, where one should remember that the optimal dis-
criminatory tari® is higher for country L than for country H. We do this job by following
two steps.
² Step 1: Given the total amount of imports at FTA with country L, switch the FTA
partner from L to H.
² Step 2: Adjust optimally the total imports and the external tari® to the non-partner
L.
For making the analysis sensible enough, we focus our attention on the case in which the
initial FTA with country L imposes a strictly external tari®, tLH > 0.
In Step 1, following Lemma 3, we con¯ne ourselves to a certain total output XLT and the
tari® vector t = (tH ; tL) satisfying
X
k
nk ¢ tk1
sk
¡ ¸kP 0(XT )
= nH ¢ t
L
H
1
sH
¡ ¸HP 0(XLT )
: (19)
Then insofar the total output is unchanged at XLT , our marginal import cost from each
each country can be replaced with what we may call the constrained marginal import cost,
which shows the marginal import cost from each exporting country when the total import
volume is kept constant.
As is shown by (10), given the marginal cost (BP-MC), the export price of each exporting
country, given by
vi(Xi; XT ) = C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
¡ ¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT ) = ci +
µ
1
sini
¡ ¸i
ni
P 0(XT )
¶
Xi;
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depends only on its export and it is linear in the own export when the total import volume
XT is constant. and thus we may de¯ne its associated constrained marginal import cost,
denoted by MICi(Xi; XT ), by
MIC
i(Xi; XT ) := C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
+
Xi
ni
C 00i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
¡ 2¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )
= ci + 2
µ
1
sini
¡ P 0(XT )¸i
ni
¶
Xi:
Note that in general this constrained marginal import cost has the following relation to the
unconstrained one given by (MIC).
MICi(Xi; Xj) =MIC
i(Xi; Xj)¡ P 00(XT )
X
k
¸k
nk
X2k ;
so that (MIC-ALT) implies
MIC
i(Xi; XT ) = ¡ci ¡ 2ti + 2P (XT ): (20)
Each country's constrained marginal cost curve is thus linear and strictly upward sloping
as illustrated by Figures 3 and 4. In each, the line segment 0H0L is equal to the total import
given by XLT associated with the domestic price pD in the importing country. The import
from country H is measured rightward from point 0H , while the import from country L is
measured leftward from point 0L. The upward sloping curve civi(i = H;L) shows the export
price of exporting country i and the upward sloping curve ciMICi(i = H;L) its associated
constrained marginal import cost curve.
The equilibrium of FTA with country L is shown by point FL, where the domestic price
line pDpD0 crosses the export price curve of country L. Of the total import, L0L comes from
country L, and 0HL from country H. The tari® imposed on country H, tLH , is measured by
the di®erence between its export price (measured by LvLH) and the domestic price, i.e., the
line segment vLHFL.
Now take the case illustrated by Figure 3 ¯rst and consider the switch of the FTA partner
to country H given the total amount of imports. This requires the export price of country H
to be equal to the domestic price, which is shown by point FH . More import of 0HH comes
from country H, and the import from country L decreases to 0LH facing the tari® of FHvHL .
The change in the total import costs are measured by the areas ¢MLLM
L
HD
¤ (showing
the decreased costs) and ¢MHL M
H
HD
¤ (showing the increased costs), where point D¤ shows
the equalized marginal import costs from the two exporting countries. When the importing
country expands its import from country H up to 0HH, the increased imports LD¤0 increases
the import costs from country H as much as the trapezoid shape ofMLHLD
¤0D¤ but decreases
as much as the trapezoid shape of MLLLD
¤0, which gives rise to net decrease in the total costs
18
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Figure 3: FTA Partner Switch { Case 1
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as much as ¢MLLM
L
HD
¤. But the further import from country H raises the import cost from
country H as much as D¤D¤0HMHH but reduces the import cost from country L as much
as D¤D¤0MHL , which amounts to net increase in the total import costs by ¢M
H
L M
H
HD
¤.
Therefore the importing country gains from the FTA partner switch as much as ¢MLLM
L
HD
¤
minus ¢MHL M
H
HD
¤. As one can verify in view of the ¯gure, the importing country is actually
better o® if and only if the following condition holds.
| Welfare-improving condition: The sum of country H's marginal import cost
minus country L's at two FTA equilibria is strictly positive, i.e,³
MIC
L(XLL ; X
L
T )¡MICH(XLH ; XLT )
´
+
³
MIC
L(XHL ; X
L
T )¡MICH(XHH ; XLT )
´
> 0:
0H
0L
cH
cL
vH
vL
D
L H
MIC
H
MIC
L
D
∗
D
′
pD
p
′
D
v
L
H
c
′
L
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L
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L
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v¯H
M¯H
p¯D
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P r i c e QuantitytLH
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Figure 4: FTA Partner Switch { Case 2
Unlike Figure 3, Figure 4 indicates the case in which the export price of country H
supplying the total import, measured by ¹vH , is lower than the domestic price pD, so that
the FTA formation with country H requires the total import to increase. When the market
demand curve of the importing country is given by the downward-sloping curve DD0, then
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the FTA formation requires the market equilibrium to settle at point FH and to totally
exclude the import from country L. The associated increase in the import costs is now
measured by ¢D¤MHcL plus the trapezoid area 2MHp0DFHM
H
H . Note that when we extend
the constrained marginal import cost curve of country L up to what is shown by the curve
MIC
L
c0L and thus literally follow the above welfare-improving, then the increased import
cost amounts to the area ¢D¤MHL M
H
H , which is larger than what is actually incurred. Thus
if the condition is satis¯ed, then the switch of the FTA partner is de¯nitely welfare-improving
for the importing country. For this reason, we hereafter employ the above condition for
evaluating whether the switch of the FTA partner improves the importing country's welfare.
Let us give a more precise expression for this welfare-improving condition. By virtue of
(20), the di®erence in the marginal import costs is equal to
MIC
L(XL; XT )¡MICH(XH ; XT ) = cH ¡ cL + 2(tH ¡ tL); (21)
so that there hold
MIC
L(XL; XT )¡MICH(XH ; XT ) =
8<:cH ¡ cL + 2tLH under the FTA with country LcH ¡ cL ¡ 2tHL under the FTA with country H
Then the welfare-improving condition is given by
cH > cL + (tHL ¡ tLH): (22)
The tari® rate required, tLH , leading to the same total import volume as in the FTA with
country L, should satisfy (19), i.e.,
tHL =
nH
nL
¢
1
sL
¡ ¸LP 0(XT )
1
sH
¡ ¸HP 0(XT )
tLH ;
which allows us to rewrite the welfare-improving condition (22) as follows.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the marginal costs are given by (BP-MC). When the importing
country initially forms a FTA with country L with the external tari® tLH to country H, then
its switch in the FTA partner to country H while keeping the total import constant makes the
importing country's welfare better o® if there holds
cH > cL +
(
nH
nL
¢
1
sL
¡ ¸LP 0(XT )
1
sH
¡ ¸HP 0(XT )
¡ 1
)
tLH :
There are a couple of interesting special cases for discussion. First, consider the case
discussed by Bhagwati and Panagriya (1996), i.e., cH > cL and 0 < sL < sH = +1. Then
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the welfare-improving condition is given by
cH > cL +
(
nH
nL
¢
1
sL
¡ ¸LP 0(XT )
(¡¸HP 0(XT )) ¡ 1
)
tLH :
As the braced term on the right hand side is strictly positive for nH ¸ nL, the importing
country ¯nds it more bene¯cial to form a FTA with the exporting country having the higher
export-choke price and more ¯rms, i.e., the country which is less e±cient but more competitive
in the sense that it has more active ¯rms.
The second is the case in which the two exporting countries are symmetric except the
export choke price ci, then the welfare-improving condition in the above proposition reduces
to cH > cL. Thus it is more preferable for the importing country to form a FTA with country
H having the higher export-choke price than with country L.
Now we can further extend the present approach to welfare comparison between any two
tari® policies, t0 := (t0H ; t
0
L) and t
00 := (t00H ; t
00
L). In view of (20), we may rewrite the welfare-
improving condition above and establish
Proposition 7 Suppose that the marginal costs are given by (BP-MC), and consider any two
tari® policies t0 := (t0H ; t
0
L) and t
00 := (t00H ; t
00
L) satisfyingX
k
nk ¢ t
0
k
1
sk
¡ ¸kP 0(XT )
=
X
k
nk ¢ t
00
k
1
sk
¡ ¸kP 0(XT )
> 0; (TC)
where XT is the equilibrium total import volume associated with the tari® policy t0. When the
change in the tari® policies from t0 to t00 entails import expansion from country H, then the
importing country gest better o® by such a policy switch if there holds
cH ¡ cL >
¡
t0L + t
00
L
¢¡ ¡t0H + t00H¢ : (BT)
If the change in the tari® policies entails import expansion from country L, the welfare-
improving condition is given by (BT) where the inequality is reversed.
Proposition 6 is a special case of the above proposition where the two tari® policies are
those associated with FTA formations. We may also use this proposition to compare the
welfares between the uniform tari® policy and the FTA formation. Consider any uniform
tari® rate tU as the initial tari® policy. Then Proposition 7 indicates that, given the total
import volume under the uniform tari® policy, the FTA formation with country H is better
for the importing country than the uniform tari® policy if there holds cH ¡ cL > tHL where
tHL > 0 follows from (TC), which holds when cH is su±ciently greater than cL.
15
15Of, this cost di®erence should be too large, for the importing country ¯nds it optimal to exclude the
imports from country H even when it is constrained to employ uniform tari® policies. See footnotes 5 and 12.
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On the hand, what if the importing country forms a FTA with country L instead of
employing the uniform tari® policy. Then the welfare-improving condition is given by cH ¡
CL < ¡tLH , where tLH > 0 follows from (TC). Since this never holds, the importing country
gets strictly worse o® than under the uniform tari® policy after forming a FTA with country
L. Of course, the proposition never denies the possibility of the importing country's welfare
improvement by adjusting the external tari® and thus the total import volume, though such
a possibility is extremely limited.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the marginal costs are given by (BP-MC) in both exporting coun-
tries. Then when the importing country switch the trade policy from any uniform tari® tU (> 0)
to a FTA formation by keeping the total import volume, it always gets worse o® by choosing
country L as the FTA partner, while it gets better o® by choosing country H when there the
choke price of country H is greater than that of country L plus the external tari® tHL required
under the FTA.
As with the welfare-improving FTA formation with country H mentioned in the above
corollary, there are two remarks in order here. First, when the initial uniform tari® policy
is the optimal one maximizing the importing country's welfare, the welfare improvement
discussed above implies that the FTA formation with country H is further bene¯cial because
the importing country can adjust the external tari® rate.
Second, the switch in the trade policy mentioned in Proposition 7 implies that the post-
FTA external tari® rate becomes higher than the initial uniform tari® rate. But as pointed
above, the importing country can realize further welfare improvement by the external tari®
rate, so that it may be better o® even with the lower external tari® than under the optimal
uniform tari® policy. In fact, this is likely enough to happen if the initial uniform tari® rate
is not optimal but su±ciently higher than the optimal level.
5 Extensions of Analysis and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis in the preceding sections has elucidated that the importing country, when it forms
a FTA, has an incentive to choose the exporting country with the smaller marginal import
costs. And when we con¯ne ourselves to either constant or linearly increasing marginal costs,
the marginal cost from the country with the lower choke price (i.e., the smaller ci) becomes
smaller. In this sense, the importing country tends to choose the less e±cient exporting
country as its FTA partner.
5.1 Tari® Discrimination with Domestic Production
There are several possible directions for extending the analysis. The most important is incor-
poration of domestic production by the importing country. Insofar as we con¯ne ourselves to
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perfect competition, it is immediate to apply our discussion to such a case, for we may replace
the gross consumption bene¯t function with the gross import bene¯t one. 16 Extension to
imperfect competition is not so hard, either.
For the convenience of description, we hereafter call the importing country the \home
country" with super- or sub-scripts M . Let us denote by xM the individual output of the
domestic ¯rms, by CM (xM ) its total cost function, by nM the number of ¯rms, by ¸M its
conjectural variations and by XM := nMxM the total domestic output in the home country.
Then its welfare is now expressed by
W = U(ZT )¡ nMCM
µ
XM
nM
¶
¡
X
k=H;L
Xk ¢ IMRk(Xk; ZT );
where ZT :=
P
k=H;L;M Xk denotes the total output. The equilibrium condition for each
industry in each country is still expressed by (9) where XT is now replaced with ZT and we
newly introduced tM denoting the speci¯c production tax on the domestic ¯rms. The analysis
can be easily compared to the previous one once we devise the quasi-reaction function of the
domestic industry which represents its equilibrium total output gainst the total imports XT
as follows.
LetRM (ZT ; tM ) indicate the quasi-reaction function of the domestic industry, and consider
the market equilibrium condition given XT , i.e.,
ZT = RM (ZT ; tM ) +XT ;
which de¯nes the total output as a function of the total import given the tax on the domestic
¯rms, i.e., ZT = bZT (XT ; tM ). Substitute this for ZT in RM (ZT ; tM ) and let bRM (XT ; tD) :=
RM
³ bZT (XT ; tM ); tM´ express its new quasi-reaction function. Then we may rewrite the
welfare of the home country as below.
cW (X; tM ) = U ³XT + bRM (XT ; ; tM )´¡ nMCM Ã bRM (XT ; tM )
nM
!
¡
X
k=H;L
Xk ¢\IMR
k
(Xk; XT ; tM ) ;
where X := (XH ; XL) and\IMR
i
(Xi; XT ; tM ) := IMRi
³
Xi; XT + bRM (XT ; tM )´. The opti-
16Insofar as the domestic market is perfectly competitive, the consumption bene¯ts minus the domestic
production depends only on the domestic price, which also uniquely determines the total import demand.
Taking the inverse of the import demand function, we can then express the consumption bene¯ts minus the
domestic production costs as a function of the total import volume, which serves as our U(XT ) in the text.
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mal tari® discrimination then requires
@cW(XD;tM)
@Xi
= 0, which gives rise to
tDi = x
D
i C
00
i (x
D
i ) +X
D
i
@\IMR
i
(XDi ; X
D
T ; tM )
@Xi
+
X
k=H;L
XDk
@\IMR
i
(XDi ; X
D
T ; tM )
@XT
+\IMR
M
(XDM ; X
D
T ; tM )
Ã
¡@
bRM (XDT ; tM )
@XT
!
;
where XDM := bRM ¡XDT ; tM¢ and use was made of (9) for the domestic ¯rms. Compared with
the case of no domestic production mentioned in Proposition 4, the last positive common term,
showing the e®ect of the individual monopoly rent earned by the domestic industry, is newly
added to the optimal tari® formula. And, given the production tax on the domestic ¯rms,
tM , the di®erence in the optimal discriminatory tari®s is still characterized by Proposition 3.
One possible di®erence compared with the previous discussion can be found when the
marginal cost of each ¯rm is constant and we allow the government of the home country
to optimally set the production tax on the domestic ¯rms and maximize the welfare. The
government tries to preclude any imports from the country with the greater marginal costs
than the domestic ¯rms. This can be shown as follows.
First, when the marginal costs are constant, the optimal discriminatory tari® on the
import from country i is given by
tDi = ¡
¸i
ni
XiP
0 ¡ZDT ¢¡ P 00 ¡ZDT ¢
(
1 +
bRM
@XT
) X
k=H;L
¸k
nk
XD2k +
¡
P (ZDT )¡ cM
¢Ã¡ bRM
@XT
!
where use was made of IMRi(Xi; ZT ) = ¡¸iniXiP 0(ZT ).
Second, the optimum condition for choosing the domestic production tax, i.e., @cW@tM = 0,
yields
P (ZDT )¡ cM = ¡P 00(ZDT )
X
k=H;L
¸k
nk
XD2k < 0;
which implies that the government actually heavily subsidizes the domestic production.
Put this into the previous tari® formula, and obtain tDi =
¡
P (ZDT )¡ ci ¡ tDi
¢
+P
¡
ZDT
¢¡
cM , or equivalently
tDi
2
= P (ZDT )¡
ci + cM
2
:
Thus in view of (9), there holds
¡¸i
ni
XDi P
0(ZDT ) = P (Z
D
T )¡ ci ¡ tDi =
cM ¡ ci
2
· 0;
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which implies XDi = 0.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the marginal costs of ¯rms are constant in each country. Then
when the home country's government sets the optimal tax-cum-subsidies on the domestic
industry as well as the tari®s on the imports from abroad, the optimal tari® discrimination
precludes the imports from the exporting country with the greater marginal costs than the
domestic industry.
5.2 FTA Formation and Gains from Export Expansion
The second extension is the model to take account of the gains as the FTA partners. FTA
agreements give mutual tari® reduction between the partners, so that each country as the
exporter to the partner can also gain the bene¯ts from export expansion. By extending our
model in the previous section to the familiar reciprocal dumping model discussed by Brander
and Krugman (1983), we can explore this problem. 17
More speci¯cally, consider the world of three countries, M;H;L, where M denotes now
simply the third country M . Each country has the identical demand function, ni identical
¯rms with conjectural variation ¸i and constant marginal costs ci where cL < cM < cH . We
assume that each country's market is segmented. Then our previous analysis is the one just
focusing on an individual country's domestic market.
As we have discussed, each country as an importer has an incentive to choose the exporting
country with the greater marginal cost, so that countries H andM want to accept each other
as the FTA partner but country H, though desiring a FTA with country M , cannot form
any FTA. Even from the viewpoint of an exporter, countries H and M would prefer a FTA
between H and M . This is because when either forms a FTA with country L with the least
marginal costs, it faces the more aggressive competition with the smaller pro¯ts than under
the FTA with the other country.
5.3 Directions for Further Research
We have explored the FTA formation among the countries trading a homogeneous good.
Among the limitations of the approach, the greatest one is due to our partial equilibrium
approach. A country, trading various types of commodities and services, cannot decide its
trade policy on any speci¯c good without taking account of the possible e®ects on the trade of
other goods. Whether the markets are perfectly or imperfectly competitive, it is necessary to
incorporate this feature of interdependence in trade, i.e., substitution and complementarity
among the traded goods. 18
17For example, Yi (1996) and Yi (2000) build a general equilibrium model of reciprocal dumping and discuss
the welfare change due to a country's participating in a FTA or a CU by taking account of the gains as the
exporter, though the countries are all symmetric.
18Hwan and Mai (1991) discusses the problem of tari® discrimination for product di®erentiaion by using a
quadratic utility function. They explore how the cross substitution term in the linear demand a®ects the tari®
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There have already been many studies dealing this issue, but, to my best knowledge, most
of them depend on the model speci¯cation, often assuming symmetric among the countries,
which facilitates computation of equilibria and welfare without shedding lights on what mo-
tivates each country's choice of the partner for FTA formation or economic integration in
general. There is still much to be done.
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